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Abstract 
In the past two decades, researchers in the field of industrial organization have focused on the 
use of static, structural econometric models to estimate the degree of market power in domestic 
industries. However, these studies fail to take into account the multi-period nature ofmarkets. 
Therefore, it may be more appropriate to use a dynamic approach to estimating the degree of 
market power. This paper applies a linear-quadratic methodology, developed by Karp and 
Perloff (1989, 1993a), to the German market for banana imports. 
Assuming a quadratic objective function with linear demand and quadratic cost, and a Markov 
equation that captures the dynamic interaction among firms, a dynamic conjectural variations 
parameter is derived under open-loop and feedback strategies. Compared to the open-loop 
conjectural variations parameter, the feedback conjectural variations parameter shows a greater 
degree of collusiveness. For the purpose of hypothesis testing, standard errors on the conjectural 
variations parameter are calculated using Taylor expansion and bootstrapping methods. The 
hypothesis that market structure is peifectly competitive/peifectly collusive is rejected, however, 
the hypothesis that firms behave in Cournot-Nash fashion could not be rejected. 
1. Introduction 
In the last decade, there has been renewed interest in conducting empirical analysis in 
industrial economics, which is now commonly referred to as the "new empirical industrial 
organization" (NEIO). Compared to the Structure/Conduct/Performance approach of the 1960s 
and 1970s, which focused on reduced-form, cross-section regression analysis of industries 
(Schmalensee, 1989), the more recent approach has been characterized by the use of structural 
econometric models (Bresnahan and Schmalensee, 1987) that estimate the degree of market 
power in a given market The key difference between the two methodologies has been that while 
the former tended to assume the existence of market power across a sample of industries, the 
latter has been aimed at directly estimating market power in a specific industry. 
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There have been many applications of the new methodology to a variety of industries (see 
Bresnahan, 1989; Perloff, 1992), however, most of this empirical work has focused on the 
estimation of a market power parameter within a static, one-period framework, which may be 
inappropriate if firms operate in a multi-period environment. Non-cooperative game theory 
suggests that in a dynamic setting, fmns take account of other firms' previous behavior in 
formulating their strategies. As a consequence, it is possible that collusive equilibria can be 
obtained in repeated games (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1989). In addition, it may be more 
appropriate to use a dynamic framework when there are substantial adjustment costs in changing 
production from one period to another (Karp and Perloff, 1993a), a characteristic that is 
particularly relevant to agricultural commodity markets. 
As well as being static in nature, virtually all of the empirical studies of market power 
in the NEIO have focused on domestic markets as opposed to export markets, the most notable 
exceptions being Buschena and Perloff (1991), coconut oil export market; Karp and Perloff 
(1989, 1993b), rice and coffee export markets; and Lopez and You (1993), Haitian coffee 
exporting. Estimating the degree of imperfect competition in international markets is important 
in the context of developments over the past fifteen years in international trade theory (Helpman 
and Krugman, 1985, 1989). The key characteristic of the so-called "new trade theories" (NTis) 
is the explicit assumption of imperfectly competitive markets. In models explaining the structure 
of trade, it is commonly assumed that scale economies can lead to specialization and export in 
monopolistically competitive markets, e.g. Krugman (1979). The NITs have also made a 
significant contribution to understanding how imperfect competition can affect the gains from 
trade liberalization, e.g. Smith and Venables (1988), and, also, how different trade instruments 
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can have differential welfare effects when markets are oligopolistic, e.g. Krishna (1989). These 
developments suggest there is a premium on verifying empirically whether an international 
market(s) is(are) imperfectly competitive. 
The objective of this paper is to estimate the degree of non-competitiveness in the German 
market for banana imports using a linear-quadratic dynamic game model, originally developed 
by Karp and Perloff (1989, 1993a, 1993b). Using both open-loop and feedback strategies, a 
dynamic conjectural variations parameter is estimated, where the conjectural variations parameter 
nests the well-known market structures of perfect competition, Coumot-Nash and collusion. The 
procedure involves the estimation of a demand function and a Markov equation, the parameters 
of which are then used in the solution to a dynamic programming problem from which the 
conjectural variations parameters are then derived. 
The German banana market was chosen as a good candidate for application of this 
particular technique for three inter-related reasons: 
- frrst, there is circumstantial evidence that the banana export industry is imperfectly 
competitive. World trade in bananas, valued at $5.1 billion in 1991 (FAO, 1993), is dominated 
by three multinational frrms1, United Brands (Chiquita), Standard Fruit (Dole), and Del Monte 
(Read, 1983). Between them, these three firms account for 70 percent of the world market and 
66 percent of the European market, United Brands alone accounting for 43 percent (McCorriston 
and Sheldon, 1994). With respect to Germany, three fmns (United Brands, Standard Fruit and 
Noboa) account for about 72 percent of the market. This apparently oligopolistic market 
1. In contrast to the present study. Karp and Perloff {1989. 1993b) in their analysis of the rice and coffee 
markets assume that the relevant decision-making agents are countries through their export marketing 
boards. 
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structure derives largely from the existence of economies of scale in refrigerated shipping and 
distribution (Read, 1994). 
- second, in terms of a dynamic model structure, there are substantial adjustment costs in 
the production and export of bananas: there is a gestation period of about a year and a quarter 
between the previous and current harvest; plantation production is highly capital-intensive; 
transportation requires refrigeration and careful shipping. 
- third, the German banana import market has recently been subjected to the 
implementation of import quotas as a part of changes to the European Community's (EC) banana 
import regime (Read, 1994). As has been shown in several papers (Hwang and Mai, 1988; 
Krishna, 1989) import quotas can have the effect of "facilitating" collusion in oligopolistic 
markets, the extent depending on the nature of competition prior to implementation of the quota. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the linear-quadratic dynamic 
model used in this paper. Essentially, this involves the estimation of a demand function for 
banana imports in Germany, and a Markov equation that captures the strategic interaction among 
firms, based either on open-loop or feedback strategies. The parameters of these equations are 
then used in the solution to a dynamic programming problem in order to derive a dynamic 
conjectural variations parameter. Section 3 describes the data used to estimate the above 
parameters and reports the results of the econometric analysis, and Section 4 summarizes. 
3. A Linear-Quadratic Dynamic Game 
In the present paper, the degree of market power enjoyed by the top three firms in the 
German market for banana imports, is evaluated by estimating a dynamic conjectural variations 
5 
parameter in the context of a linear-quadratic dynamic mod.el3• When modeling oligopolistic 
markets as dynamic games, two important equilibrium concepts are commonly used: open-loop 
andfeedback Nash equilibrium. These concepts are borrowed from optimal control theory which 
often distinguishes between open-loop and feedback solutions to optimal control problems. In 
an open-loop equilibrium, controls (i.e. moves made by a firm that constitute its strategy), are 
a function of time and the initial state. The open-loop strategy space S; 0 is defined as: 
S; 0 = [x.{y(O),t) 1 xJy(O),t) is a continuous function of timet, 'V t ~ 0], 
where x/.) is the control variable (e.g. rate of change of output) of the i'h firm, y(O) is the initial 
state (e.g., initial output). Since moves are independent of the current state of the system, and 
a flllTl is committed to a preannounced plan not anticipating any response, this equilibrium is not 
subgame perfect. This strategy is naive as firms take no account of the reactions of the other 
firms. In this sense, the open-loop equilibrium is the dynamic analog of the static Nash 
equilibrium where firms assume the output choices of opponents as given. 
In contrast, in a feedback equilibrium, players design their optimal policies as decision 
rules dependent on the current state of the game. The feedback strategy space is defmed as: 
s/ = [x.{y(t),t) 1 x.{y(t),t) is a piecewise continuous function of time t ~ 0, and 
Lipschitz4-continuous w.r.t. y(t) = (yJft), ... ,y,.(t))]. 
2. The term dynamic conjectural variations was fU'St used by Riordan (1985). 
3. The term linear-quadratic comes from optimal control theory, and refers to a problem where the objective 
function is quadratic and the constraints are linear. The advantage of using a linear-quadratic approach is 
that open-loop and feedback strategies can be easily compared. It is also possible to solve analytically for 
the conjectural variations parameter in the linear-quadratic case. 
4. With respect to the state variable, the Lipschitz condition states that, there exists a non-negative constant 
K; such that lftt,y) - f{tji)U :S: K IJ-y'l. V t e [t0,1]; y,y e R ". 
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Since state variables at time t summarize the latest available information about the system at time 
t, and since firms take the mechanism for determining future behavior as given, feedback 
strategies can be referred to as Markov strategies and a feedback equilibrium can be considered 
a sub game perfect equilibrium, and firms' period of commitment is zero. The Markov equation 
is given as q1 = Gq1_1, which depicts the linear decision rules for the firms, where q1 is the output 
vector of firms at time t. It should be noted at this point that the adjustment paths for the open-
loop and feedback equilibria are the same for the limiting cases of perfect competition and 
collusion with symmetric firms (see Karp and Perloff, 1993a). 
Given the open-loop strategy, and three symmetric fmns in the Gennan banana market, 
the objective (profit) function of an individual fmn over an infmite time-horizon is assumed to 
take the following form: 
(1) L W-1((P1 - 9; - O.Sq,;q)q;1 - (co; + O.SS;u;,)uit] 
r-1 
where P1 is the Gennan retail price of bananas in period t, q;1 is the quantity of bananas exported 
to Germany by the i111 fmn in period t, u;, is the change in exports of firm i from period t-1 to 
period t, and ~ is the discount factor. The term (9; + 0.5q,,.q;Jq;1 represents the quadratic 
production cost, and (co; + 0.5S;u;JU;1 represents quadratic production adjustment cost. The 
inverse demand function P, is assumed to take a linear form: 
(2) II P = a - b'Eq. = a - bQ I 11 I 
i•1 
Converting the objective function (1) into matrix form, and deriving the first-order-condition 
restrictions, gives the following matrix equation (see appendix A): 
(3) K.V. = [G -1(/ - G)(/ - AG)]' e.a. 
I I Jo' I I 
V; is a three into one column vector with one in the z'11t row and V ij and V;.t in the remaining rows, 
where Vu is defined as du;/dui, and similarly V;r In deriving equation (3), no symmetry 
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assumptions are made, however, for analytical tractability, symmetry is introduced at this stage. 
Specifically, it is assumed that v .. = v 'lrf ;,1·; B. = B 'lrf ;; and G is symmetric such that V I 
elements G .. = g 'lrf i=J·; G .. = g 'lrf i#· It should be noted that the dynamic conjectural 
IJ 1 IJ 2 ;J 
variations parameter V ranges from -1/(n-1) for the case of perfect competition, where n is the 
number of fmns, through 0 for Cournot-Nash, to 1 for perfect collusion, the same range as in a 
static framework. 
Under the open-loop strategy concept, firms decide the optimal export path at the start 
of the game and do not revise their moves contingent on what the other fmns might do in 
subsequent periods. However, this assumption is too naive, and it is necessary to consider a 
subgame perfect feedback strategy, where optimal export choices depend not only on time but 
on the current state of the system. The value function method of dynamic programming is used 
to set up the dynamic objective function for this kind of firm behavior. If the value of the 
present and discounted future profits of firm i can be expressed as J,{ q,.Jr Vd. where V; is defined 
as above, then fmn i' s dynamic programming profit maximization problem can be written as: 
(4) l;(Q,_p V;) = max[(P,-9;-0.5.;Q;,)q;,-(co;+0.5B;u)u;,+I3J;(q,, V;)]. 
Converting this objective function into matrix form, and deriving the first-order-condition 
restrictions gives the following matrix equation (see Appendix B): 
(5) [K. + RW. + (e.e 1 . + RX.)S.]'V. = [G't1e.8. = y.B .. 
I 1-' I I I 1-' I I I I I I I 
Again, no symmetry assumptions are required for deriving this condition, however, the symmetry 
requirements used in the open-loop case are introduced here too. 
As is shown in detail in Appendices A and B, matrix equations (3) and (5) have two 
unknowns, the conjectural variations parameter V and the cost of adjustment parameter 8. The 
rest of the matrices in these equations are expressed in terms of the slope parameter of the 
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inverse demand function, b, and a lagged coefficient matrix G from the Markov equation. 
Specifically, matrix K; is expressed in terms of b, matrix X1 is expressed in terms of G, and 
matrix W1 is expressed in terms of both b and G. Therefore, it is necessary to estimate the matrix 
G, and recover the parameter bin order to solve matrix equations (3) and (5) for V and 3. The 
estimation procedure followed is outlined in the next section of the paper. 
3. Empirical Analysis 
(i) Estimation of Demand and Markov Equations 
In order to estimate the parameter b, a linear demand function was specified for the 
German banana market as follows: 
(6) Q, = a.o + a.tP: + a.2z, + ~T + a.4TT + et 
Q1 represents the total quantity of bananas imported annually into Germany over the period 1970-
1992. P, represents the real retail price of bananas; Z, is the German population aged 65-and-
above, and T and 1T are the trend variables. The demand parameter b=l la.1• Conspicuously 
absent explanatory variables in (6) are the prices of substitute fruits, income and the total 
population of Germany. As reported by the World Bank (1985), the cross-price elasticity of 
bananas with other fruits is very low. It is reported as 0 in Germany, which is similar to 
estimates for other developed countries, e.g. Huang (1993) reports a value of -0.08 for the cross 
price elasticity between bananas and oranges in the US. Thus, the choice of bananas in 
consumption is a matter of customer preference, and other fruits are not accepted as ready 
substitutes. 
The World Bank (1985) also reports that banana consumption is only responsive to 
income in countries where per capita GNP is less than $1500. In countries like Germany, with 
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a very high per capita income, banana consumption has reached saturation level with respect to 
income variations. In addition, the population of Germany has been constant over the time 
period under consideration. However, the German population is ageing over time, and, therefore, 
population in the age cohort 65-and-above is growing. Interestingly, a report by the European 
Conunission (1976) states that bananas are regarded as a health food, and they are an important 
part of the diet of the sick and very old. This justifies the inclusion of the variable ~ in the 
demand equation. 
In addition to estimating b, the dynamic model requires estimation of a system of Markov 
equations, one for each fum, where the banana exports of the three multinational firms q;,, 
i=l,.,3, are regressed on the lagged values of their own exports q;,.1 to Germany and the lagged 
values of exports of the other multinational fums qi,·'' i'¢j. 
Table 1 summarizes and describes the variables used in the estimation procedure. Annual 
data on aggregate quantities of bananas imported into Germany (Q,), retail prices (P J, and import 
prices (WJ' were collected for the period 1970-1992 from the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) publications: World Banana Economy (1983) and Banana Statistics (1992). Exogenous 
demographic variables (ZJ were collected from Warnes (1993), and the International Labour 
Office (ILO) publication: From Pyramid to Pillar (1989)6• Other exogenous variables used are 
a time trend <n and a squared time trend (17). A consumer price index, used for deflating the 
nominal variables was collected from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) publication: 
International Financial Statistics (1992, 1994). Quantities of bananas exported to Germany by 
S. Import price refers to the f.o.r. price charged by impOO.ers to wholesalers at the port of Hamburg. 
6. Total population figures were available for every year; however, population for age 6S-and-above, was 
reported as a percentage of total population every five years. Other values were intetpolated. 
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the individual multinational fmns were not available directly; however, market shares of 
multinational fmns in the Gennan banana market were available for a certain number of years. 
These market shares were collected from the magazine, International Fruit World (1988), and 
the FAO publications, World Banana Economy (1983, 1986). 
Variable 
q, 
T 
1T 
Table 1: Description of Variables 
Description 
Real retail price of bananas in German market: DM/tonne 
Total quantity of bananas imported into Germany: thousand tonne/year 
Quantity imported into Germany by Bonita: thousand tonne/year 
Quantity imported into Germany by Chiquita: thousand tonne/year 
Quantity imported into Germany by Dole: thousand tonne/year 
Column vector of q1,.. q2, and q3, 
One year lagged quantity imported into Germany by Bonita 
One year lagged quantity imported into Germany by Chiquita 
One year lagged quantity imported into Germany by Dole 
Column vector of q1,_1, q2,.1 and qJt-J 
Time trend= 1, 2, .•.. 
Squared time trend= 1, 4, .•.. 
Real import price of bananas in German market OM/tonne 
German population: Age 65-and-above 
Instrumental Variables was used to estimate the demand function (6), where the 
instruments used were import price, population aged 65-and-above, time and time-squared. The 
results of the estimation are presented in Table 2, indicating that the R-square between observed 
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and predicted is 0.95. Although the Durbin-Watson ratio lies in the inconclusive range for 
rejecting the hypothesis of the existence of autocorrelation, it is also clear that it is very close 
to the upper bound where the hypothesis of the existence of autocorrelation can be rejected. In 
the above regression, the relevant parameter a.1= -0.32 is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. 
Table 2: Estimation of the Demand Function 
Q, = 684 - 0.32P, + 106Z, • SOT + 4.217' 
(1.11)" (-3.6) (1.80) (-11.4) (13.0) 
R-square between observed and predicted= 0.95 
DL=0.77 < DW(23,4>=1.48 < Du=l.53 at 1% significance. 
-pigures in parenthesis refer to t ratios. 
Appendix A and Appendix B show that matrix G establishes a relationship between q1 and 
q,.1 given by: q, = Gq,.1• To recover matrix G, this relationship is estimated using Zellner's 
(1962) seemingly unrelated equations (SURE) method. The model requires restricting the 
elements of the G matrix such that the own lagged coefficients (g1) are the same for the three 
fmns, and lagged coefficients for the other tinns (g2) are the same for the three fums. The F 
statistic for imposing these restrictions is 1.6, and the critical value for testing the restrictions, 
F(7 ,36) is 2.3 at the 5 percent significance level. Therefore, the restrictions cannot be rejected. 
Since the restrictions could not be rejected, they were imposed, and then the regression equations 
were estimated, the results being presented in Table 3. 
It should be noted that the equations were estimated for 16 observations. While market 
share data were simply not available for some of the earlier years in the 1970s, the most recent 
12 
three years were excluded because of an unusual export trend generated by expectations about 
the EC's common import policy for bananas. By the end of 1992, the EC was deliberating on 
setting common quotas and tariffs on banana imports. In light of this, the banana multinationals 
started exporting large amounts of bananas to the EC, expecting that the level of quotas would 
be influenced by the amounts imported in recent years. Therefore, recent exports of bananas do 
not reflect strategic interaction of firms, but were instead the result of an anticipated exogenous 
policy change. 
Table 3: Banana Export Adjustment (Markov) Equation. 
Bonita: qu Chiquita: q21 Dole: q3, 
Time trend 2.43 3.85 2.36 
(6.10)" (5.20) (4.95) 
Own lagged exports (g1) 0.85376 0.85376 0.85376 
(22.97} (22.97) (22.97) 
Lagged exports of ~0.03485 ~.03485 -0.03485 
other fums (g2) (~3.22) (-3.22) (-3.22) 
R-square 0.97 0.83 0.51 
Durbin-Watson 2.6 1.4 1.3 
Durbin's h -1.53 1.15 1.47 
• Figures in parenthesis refer to t ratios. 
The Durbin-Watson test is not valid for the estimated equations since they have a lagged 
dependent variable as one of the explanatory variables. For this reason, Durbin's h test was 
performed. For all three equations, the test statistic is less than the critical value of ±1.645 at 
the 5 percent significance level. Therefore, the hypothesis that there is no frrst-order 
autocorrelation cannot be rejected. Further, the coefficients g1 and g2 do satisfy the required 
stability conditions, i.e., (-1 < g1 + (n-l)g2 < 1) and (-1 < g1 - g2 < 1). 
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( ii) Estimation of V and 8 
Having estimated the G matrix, and the slope of the inverse demand function b, and 
having assumed Vii = V, 0; = o, matrix equations (3) and (5) can now be solved for V and o. 
Both of the matrix equations now represent a system of three equations with two unknowns. It 
can also be noted that the rank of the matrices in (3) and (5) is two, therefore, only the first two 
equations need to be solved simultaneously to recover the values of V and 8. It turns out that, 
in both cases, Vis a function of G alone, and o is a function of both band G. For the open-loop 
case, a unique solution exists for V; however, for the feedback case, there are two solutions that 
emerge from solving a quadratic equation in V. One solution is close to the open-loop value, and 
the other is infeasible (V < -0.5 or V > 1). Therefore, only the feasible root is chosen as the 
solution. The relevant algebra is described in Appendix C. 
The solutions to both the open-loop and feedback strategies satisfy the restrictions 
required by theory, i.e.: -0.5 s; V s; 1 and 0 > 0. No ready standard errors are available for V, 
because Vis not retrieved directly from a regression equation. However, standard errors can be 
calculated for V using the Taylor expansion method7• The results of this procedure are 
summarized in Table 4. The subscripts of V, o and f, refer to the open-loop and feedback 
strategies respectively, and the superscript c refers to classical estimates, named as such to 
distinguish them from the bootstrap estimates that are discussed subsequently. 
The results show that both values of V are positive, however, the hypothesis of Coumot-
Nash behavior cannot be rejected. The hypothesis of collusive behavior is also rejected for both 
7. We benefitted from an e-mail discussion with Professor Perloff on how to employ the Taylor expansion 
method to calculate the standard error of v. and he kindly made available a copy of the original program 
for doing this. 
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types of finn behavior. Under the open-loop strategy assumption, the hypothesis of perfect 
competition cannot be rejected. Only in the case of feedback strategies, can the hypothesis of 
perlect competition be rejected. 
Table 4: Classical Estimates of Dynamic Model. 
0.08 
(0.36). 
Hypothesis 
0.187 
Ho:V:=-0.5, H1:V:>-0.5 
Ho:V:=O, H1:V:;tO 
Ho:V:=l, HI:V:<l 
Ho: V".r=-0.5, HI: V",r>-0.5 
Ho: V't=0, H1: ~ :,t() 
Ho:V'.r=l. HI:V'j<l 
0.20 
(0.33) 
0.191 
Test Statistic Remark 
1.60 
0.22 
2.50 
2.13 
0.60 
2.42 
Cannot reject Ho at 5% or 1%. 
Cannot reject Ho at any level. 
Reject Ho at any level. 
Reject Ho at 5% & 2.5%. 
Cannot reject Ho at any level. 
Reject Ho at 5% and 1%. 
"Figures in parenthesis are standard errors. 
As an alternative to the classical estimates derived from the Taylor expansion, a bootstrap 
procedure can also be utilized. The bootstrapping method (Efron, 1979) is a computer-intensive, 
nonparametric approach to statistical inference based on data resampling. Freedman and Peters 
(1984) have shown that when lagged endogenous variables are used as explanatory variables, and 
there is no autocorrelation, a model can be bootstrapped by resampling the rows of the original 
data. The Markov equation has lagged endogenous variables as explanatory variables, and 
Durbin's h test shows that there is no first-order autocorrelation, therefore, bootstrapping was 
performed by resampling the original data with replacement In the present context, this involves 
bootstrapping the Markov equation, and generating numerous values of g1 and g2• These values, 
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in turn, are used to calculate V and B, along with their mean values and standard errors. 
The results of this procedure are given in Table 5, where superscript B refers to the 
bootstrap estimate. Resampling and regressing the data 1000 times with replacement, the in-
equality restrictions on g1 and g2, and V and B are imposed, and constrained estimates of V and 
B are derived. While the estimates of V are a little lower than in the classical case, their relative 
position is maintained. The standard errors of V show a similar pattern. Also, the values of B 
are higher than in the classical case, but their relative position is maintained. The standard errors 
of B are also calculated based on bootstrapping the Markov equations that generate multiple 
values of g1 and g2• However, B is a function not only of g1 and g2, but also of b, the inverse 
demand slope, thus, simultaneous bootstrapping of b is also necessary. However, for the present 
analysis b is assumed to be given, and bootstrapping is performed only on the Markov equation. 
Therefore, it would be correct to describe the standard errors of B as pseudo-standard errors. 
Table 5: Bootstrapping• of Dynamic Model. 
Open-loop Feedback 
Mean values of V and S V:=0.06, 3!=0.22 ¥',=0.17, SS,=0.23 
Standard error 
Values 
rejected 
because 
Unstable 
} a< o 
v < -0.5 
V>1 
•tooo iterations perfonned. 
0.33, 0.13 
0.2% 
2.8% 
2.8% 
8.7% 
0.30, 0.13 
0.2% 
0.0% 
2.8% 
8.7% 
Having bootstrapped the values of V, it is an interesting exercise to look at how the Vs 
are distributed over the feasible range. Figure 1 indicates that the distribution of the open-loop 
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Vs has a thicker left tail while the distribution of the feedback Vs has almost symmetric small 
tails. The concentration of values is in the interval (-0.25 < V < 0.5). The percentage of Vs 
lying in this range is nearly 70 percent for the open-loop Vs, and nearly 79 percent for the 
feedback V.s Similarly, Figure 2 shows that the value of B is concentrated in the interval 0.1 to 
0.3. The highest frequency being in the range 0.1 to 0.2. 
Figure 1: Distribution of Vs. 
-0.375 -0.125 0.125 0.37.5 0.62.5 0.87.5 
Game theory suggests that the values of V must converge when markets are perfectly 
competitive or (perfectly) collusive. i.e. the values of V0 and V1 must be the same at V = -0.5 
and V = 1. In a perfectly competitive market (where n --+ oo) firms are mere price takers, and, 
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thus, have no effect on the behavior of other firms or the market price. Therefore, open-loop and 
feedback behavior should converge. Similarly, in the case of either a perfectly collusive or 
monopoly market, there is no strategic interaction among firms since fmns either form a cartel 
or there is only one flrm in the market Therefore, once again, open-loop and feedback behavior 
should converge. In short, in a perfectly competitive or monopolistic market, frrm(s) is/are 
playing a game against nature and not against each other. This intuition then, can be verified by 
looking at the bootstrapped values of V. In Figure 3, selected values of Vo are plotted on the x-
axis, and corresponding values of V1 (and Vo too) are plotted on the on y-axis. 
The figure shows that V 0 and Vr do converge to each other at the values -0.5 and 1, and for other 
values, v r is higher than v o• 
Figure 2: Distribution of Os. 
O.OS 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.15 0.85 0.95 
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Figure 3: Convergence of V., and Vl' 
1 
0.8 
~ 0.6 
"t'.3 0.4 i 
--0 ;.> 0.2 <.-. 
0 
Vo 
--I'll 
~ 0 
= 
Vf 
"a 
> 
-0.2 
-0.4 
-0.6 
-0.5 -0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 
Selected values ofVo 
Finally, the results of hypothesis tests conducted for the bootstrap estimates of V and 5 
are presented in Table 7. In the classical case, the hypothesis of perfect competition was not 
rejected in the case of open-loop behavior, but it was rejected for feedback behavior. In the case 
of the bootstrap estimates, perfect competition is rejected under both open-loop and feedback 
behavior. The hypothesis of collusive behavior is also rejected in both cases. Only the 
hypothesis of Coumot-Nash behavior is not rejected. Calculation of the pseudo-standard error 
also allowed hypothesis testing for o. For both behavioral assumptions, the hypothesis of 0=0 
was rejected. This shows that, even though the absolute value of the parameter is small, it is 
statistically significant, and the costs of adjustment in banana production are important. 
4. Summary 
Table 7: Hypothesis Testing for Bootstrapped V and 8 
Hypoiliesis t-ratio 
1.70 
0.17 
-2.90 
1.74 
2.20 
0.56 
-2.70 
1.76 
Remark 
Reject Ho at 5%. 
Cannot reject Ho. 
Reject Ho at any level. 
Reject Ho at 5%. 
Reject Ho at 5% and 2.5%. 
Cannot reject Ho. 
Reject Ho at all levels. 
Reject Ho at 5%. 
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This paper has focused on the degree of market power exhibited by firms in exporting 
bananas to the German market. Using a linear-quadratic dynamic oligopoly model, dynamic 
conjectural variations parameters were estimated under open-loop and feedback strategies. The 
results indicate that the German market for banana imports is not perfectly competitive in 
structure. Using a bootstrapping procedure, the maintained hypothesis of perfect competition is 
unequivocally rejected, however, the hypothesis that the fmns operate in a Cournot-Nash fashion 
cannot be rejected. In addition, the classical estimate of the dynamic conjectural variations of 
the feedback model is 0.2, which is greater than the value consistent with Cournot-Nash behavior. 
The estimates of the adjustment parameter 8 are positive and statistically significant in both the 
open-loop and feedback strategy models. This result supports the hypothesis that there are 
dynamic production adjustment costs in the banana industry. 
In conclusion, the Folk Theorem (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1989) suggests that estimates of 
conjectural variations, derived in a dynamic setting should turn out to be more collusive than 
those derived from a static model. This is substantiated by this study. In an earlier paper, 
Deodhar and Sheldon (1994), using a static model, have derived a conjectural variations 
parameter for the German banana import market which is lower than the Cournot-Nash value. 
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In this paper, the dynamic model generates a value which is greater than the Cournot-Nash value, 
indicating that market appears to be more imperfectly competitive than suggested by results from 
a static model. 
Appendix A: 
Converting the open-loop objective function (1) for a representative finn in the matrix 
form, and writing it in continuous time gives the following expression: 
_ I 1 I 1 I 
- ] fe 1Ae, q, - -;{/• K,q, - 2"• S,J<, dt 
where the discount factor j3 is written in terms of discount rate r; A = (a - 9J; e; is the r11 unit 
vector; q, is the column vector of q;;, K; = b(ee; + e,.e') + q,,.e,.e;; u, is the column vector of u;;, 
and S; = e,.e,!,;, where B; is the cost of adjustment parameter of the itlt fmn. It is assumed that 
m,=O, which implies that adjustment costs are minimized when there is no adjustment. The 
explicit matrix forms for finn 1, in a triopoly market (n=3) are as below: 
qlt ~2b+4l; b b] 
q,, · K1 = b 0 0 • u, = 
q31 b 0 0 
In deriving the fl.rst order conditions, attention is restricted to the quadratic part of the 
problem, since interest lies in imposing restrictions not on the intercept terms, but on the demand 
slope and the coefficients of the Markov equation8• 
The Lagrangian for the z"h firm is written as: 
L, = t.ll'-g.q: Kfi, - ~ u: S,J<, + ~(q~, + u, - q)] 
where ~~ is an (n x 1) column vector. After differentiating the Lagrangian, the following 
equations emerge: 
8. The derivations are borrowed from the original work by Karp and Perloff (1993c). In order to clarify the 
presentation, intermediate steps have been added. 
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(Al) 
-K n - A. + RA,. = 0 i'f I &I !-' It+ i 
(A2) I I 'I 
-v. s u + v. 1\.. = 0 l J t l !t 
Here V; is an (n x 1) column matrix with 1 in the i11t row and V,1 in the f'' row. The term V;j = 
du. d 1 
_
11
, '<;f i '* j , an , V i=j . For example, the vector V1 for finn 1 is as follows: 
duiz 
Now, it is assumed that A;1 is a linear function of q; i.e., A;1 = H;/110 for some (n x n) square 
matrix H;,. Letting T -+ oo so that H;, -+ H;. equation (A2) becomes: 
I I 
-v. S u + V. H n = 0, i = 1, ... , n I 1 1 l 1"'f I 
Now simplify the right hand side: 
(A3) . 
. . 
Now, equation (A3) conditions are stacked for all firms to get: 
(A4) Eq, = Su1 
where the i'11 row of E is V;H;. and the z"11 row of s is o,e;. Uz is defined as q, - qt·l· Therefore, 
(A4) can be written as: 
Let: 
(AS) (S - Er1S = G 
(A6) 
Substituting H,.q, for A;, in equation (Al): 
Using (A6) this is rewritten as: 
(A7) 
From the deflnition of G in (AS): 
-K,.q, - Hfl, + f3Hl/,.t = 0 
. 
. . 
S = (S - E)G 
S-SG= -EG 
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. 
. . 
S(l - G)G -t = -E 
E = S(/ - G -1) 
Pre-multiply both sides of (A4) by e; to get 
Now use equation (A 7) to write: 
(AS) . 
. . 
This is equation (3) in the text 
Appendix B: 
e/ E = e( S(I - G -1) 
v.' H. = o.e.' (l - G -1) 
' ' • i 
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Converting all the variables in into matrix form, the stationary dynamic programming 
problem can be written as: 
(Bl) 
The first-order condition is: 
Stacking such conditions for n fmns to obtain: 
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(B2) 
where the i'" row of E is v;'(Ki + S; + ~H;), and the i1h row of S is o,.e;. Equation (B2) can be 
written in the form: 
(B3) 
where G = E 1S. Substituting equation (B3) into (Bl) gives: 
(B4) 
(BS) 
(-}~.' _ ,H,,, _,) = max [ -}IL.a 1 (K, + s, + !lH,)Gq,_, + q,~,G 1 S,q,_, + -}IL,s,<l,_, J 
= max [-}IL.[a 1 (K, + s, + I}H,) - G 1 s, - sp + s,k-,] 
. 
. . H. = G'(K. + S. + AH.)G - G 1S.- S.G + S . I I I )J l l I I 
Now vectorize equation (B5) by perfonning the vee operation: 
Vee H. = Vee [G'(K. + S. + AH.)G - G1 S. - S.G + s.] 
I I I tJ ' J ! A 
= (G' ® G')vec (K;+ S; + ~H;) - (I® G') Vee (S) 
- (G' ® l) Vec(S) + Vec(S) - (G' ®I) Vec(S) + Vee (S) 
= [<G' ® G')Vec(K) + (CG' ® G') - (I ® G') - (G' ® l) + I}Vec(S)] 
(I - (3(G' ® G')]Vec H; 
= [<G'®G')Vec(K) + ((G'®G')-(J®G')-(G'®l)+J) o;Vec(e,.e/)] 
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(B6) :. Vee H; = [! - ~(G' ® G')r [<G' ® G')Vec(K)] 
+ [I - ~(G'®G')r [CG'®G') - (I - G') - (G'®l) + I] Vec(e,.e/)8, 
Equation (B6) can be expressed in short as: 
Vee H. = oo. + x.c. 
I : : t 
where OO; is the frrst term of the right hand side of (B6), and X; is the second term except 8;. 
Here, Vee H;, OO; and X; are all (n2 x 1) column vectors. Therefore, equation (B4) can be 
converted back in the form of (n x n) vectors by using the inverse-vec(torization) operation. It 
then takes the form: 
(B7) H.= W. +X. 8. 
l I I I 
where W;, X; are the transformed forms of oo, and X; having the dimension, (n x n). 
Now, once again, consider equations (B2) and (B3). It is known from these equations: EG = S. 
Take the i111 row of EG = S, i.e., 
(B8) 
Substitute the value of H; from equation (B7) into equation (B8): 
(B9) . 
. . 
This is equation (5) in the text 
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Appendix C: 
Solving the open-loop model for V and 0 
The restriction derived in Appendix A is the following: 
K.V. = [G -1(/ - G)(/ - AG)r e.O. 
J J .... J J 
Imposing the symmetry conditions, and expanding the matrices, (assuming n=3): 
where Z is a symmetric matrix, and $; is assumed to be 0, which implies that marginal cost is 
constant. The matrices are multiplied to obtain two equations: 
b = Zvo 
2b + 2bV = Zuo 
o = ...!!__ , and v = 2u - 1 
z2.1 2Z2.l 
Solving the feedback model for V and S 
The restriction derived in Appendix B is the following: 
[K. + RW. + (ee,! + Rv.)s.Jv. = G'-1e.S. =y,.O; 
' p ' J ~J J ' ': 
Under the assumption of symmetry, the rank of the matrices in the above equations is two, and 
we need to look only at the first two equations. Define matrix A; and E so that Bd = K; + ~W; 
and Bi = e,e; + 13X;· The i'h and!" equation is: 
~A.. + V E A··) + (B.. + V E B ··)o = y .. o II II) II I) II ftti joti 
and 
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where A,1, B,1 and Yu are elements of A', B' andy,. Solving the second equation gives o as a linear 
function of b and a nonlinear function of V. Substituting the value of 8 into the first equatlon 
gives a quadratic in V that is mdependent of b. Of the two roots of V, one is closer to the open-
loop solution, and the other falls outside the theoretical range. Therefore, the feasible root is 
picked. Here, Vis a function of~ and G, and 8 is a function of b, f3 and G. 
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